Emission Reduction and Coordination Decision in Cold Chain Logistics Service Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion

doi:10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.2108-0186

Abstract

Abstract:

In the context of carbon cap-and-trade, for the cold chain logistics service supply chain composed of a logistics service integrator and a cold chain logistics service provider, the paper uses the Stackelberg game method, based on the consideration that the integrator or provider has risk-averse tendencies, to explore the influence of risk-averse tendencies of integrator and provider on the decision of cold chain logistics service supply chain reduction and coordination, and based on the Rubinstein bargaining model, a profit-sharing contract is designed to achieve supply chain coordination. Studies show that the risk aversion tendency of integrators will reduce their bargaining power, which is not conducive to their own development, but it is conducive to providers to carry out emission reduction actions and improve cold chain service levels. The risk aversion tendency of integrators will reduce their bargaining power, and it is also not conducive to their own emission reduction actions and improvement of cold chain service levels. The tendency of both integrator and providers to be risk-averse reduces their own utility and increases the utility of the other firm. Under the contract model, the risk-averse tendency of integrator and providers can improve their own competitiveness within the supply chain and reduce the competitiveness of the other firm within the supply chain.

Key words: risk-averse, cold chain logistics service supply chain, Stackelberg game, profit sharing contract

摘要：

在碳限额交易的背景下，针对由物流服务集成商和冷链物流服务供应商组成的冷链物流服务供应链，考虑集成商或供应商具有风险规避倾向，运用Stackelberg博弈法，探究了集成商和供应商风险规避倾向对冷链物流服务供应链减排与协调决策的影响，并基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型，设计了利润共享契约，以实现供应链的协调。研究表明：集成商风险规避倾向会降低自身的议价能力，不利于自身的发展，但有利于供应商开展减排行动和提高冷链服务水平；集成商风险规避倾向会降低自身议价能力，同时也不利于自身开展减排行动和提高冷链服务水平；集成商和供应商风险规避倾向均会降低自身的效用，提高对方企业的效用；契约模型下，集成商和供应商风险规避倾向能提高自身在供应链内部的竞争力，降低对方企业的竞争力。

关键词: 风险规避, 冷链物流服务供应链, Stackelberg博弈法, 利润共享契约

ZHANG Fang, WU Jie, YANG Yue. Emission Reduction and Coordination Decision in Cold Chain Logistics Service Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion[J]. Computer Engineering and Applications, 2021, 57(24): 259-267.

张芳，武杰，杨悦. 风险规避的冷链物流服务供应链减排协调决策[J]. 计算机工程与应用, 2021, 57(24): 259-267.

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