Abstract:

Aiming at the green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper focuses on the retailers’social responsibility performance, and uses Stackelberg game to explore the impact of different forms of government subsidies on research and development  investment of green manufacturers and social responsibility of retailers under different subsidies, as well as the optimal subsidy strategy and the optimal subsidy rate of the government. The researches suggest that government subsidies have a influence on research and development investment in green manufacturing and retailers’ social responsibility, and government subsidies are conducive to encourage manufacturers to increase research and development of green products and encourage retailers to undertake more social responsibility. In the case of government subsidies, the social welfare increases first and then decreases with the subsidy rate, and there is a maximum value. Within a certain threshold, the social welfare is the largest when the government subsidizes the manufacturer’s green research and development. The government’s optimal subsidy strategy is to subsidize the manufacturer’s green product research and development investment, and the optimal subsidy rate exists. Government subsidies can narrow the profit gap between manufacturers and retailers, and enhance the stability of  supply chain.

Key words: green supply chain, government subsidies, Stackelberg game, social responsibility

摘要：

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链，主要关注零售商履行社会责任的情况，运用斯塔克尔伯格博弈，探究不同政府补贴形式对绿色制造商研发投入和零售商履行社会责任的影响，以及政府的最优补贴策略和最优补贴率。研究发现，政府补贴对绿色制造研发投入和零售商履行社会责任存在影响，且政府补贴有利于激励制造商加大绿色产品的研发，有利于激励零售商履行更多的社会责任；政府补贴的情况下，社会福利随补贴率呈先增大后减小的趋势，存在极大值，且在一定阈值内，政府对制造商绿色研发给予补贴时的社会福利最大；政府的最优补贴策略是对制造商绿色产品研发投入给予补贴，且最优补贴率存在；政府补贴能够缩小制造商和零售商的利润差，有利于提高供应链的稳定性。

关键词: 绿色供应链, 政府补贴, 斯塔克尔伯格博弈, 社会责任