Abstract: A supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered to research on cooperative emission reduction and low-carbon propaganda, the Stackelberg game theory is used to construct a decentralized decision-making game model for a single low-carbon propaganda subsidy（SS） from the manufacturer to retailer and a double low-carbon propaganda subsidy（DS） from the government to manufacturer and from the manufacturer to retailer. The optimal carbon reduction rate, low-carbon propaganda efforts and the proportion of low-carbon propaganda costs are obtained. Through the comparative analysis, it is shown that under the DS mode the profits of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, reduction rate, low-carbon propaganda effort and low-carbon propaganda cost share are superior to SS mode when the government subsidy coefficient exceeds a certain value. The increase of government subsidies, the difficulty of reducing emissions and the reduction of the cost coefficient of retailer’s propaganda efforts will increase the profits of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.

Key words: single subsidy, double subsidies, low-carbon propaganda, Stackelberg game

摘要： 考虑由一个制造商主导的一个零售商构成的供应链，研究供应链的合作减排及低碳宣传问题，运用斯坦伯格博弈理论分别构建了制造商给予零售商的单一低碳宣传补贴（SS）以及政府给予制造商、制造商给予零售商的双重低碳宣传补贴（DS）的分散决策博弈模型，得到最优的减排水平、低碳宣传努力程度以及低碳宣传成本分摊比例。通过比较分析发现：当政府补贴系数超过一定值时，DS模式下供应链利润、制造商利润、零售商利润、减排水平、低碳宣传努力程度及低碳宣传成本分摊比例均优于SS模式；政府补贴系数的增加、减排难度的降低及零售商的宣传努力成本系数降低会增加制造商、零售商以及供应链利润。最后运用算例验证了模型的有效性。

关键词: 单一补贴, 双重补贴, 低碳宣传, 斯坦伯格博弈