Abstract: Considering that more and more online shopping websites in our country provide Internet-based credit payment strategies to consumers as an important marketing tool, a function of promotion effort level affecting consumers’ needs is constructed. The paper analyzes the supply chain consist of single manufacturer and single online website to study the pricing and promotion effort of  the supply chain. By using Stackelberg game to analyze the optimal decision among supply chain entrepreneur and compare it with centralized model, in order to promote the promotion level of online shopping website, the “cost sharing and revenue sharing” contract has been established to achieve the coordination of online supply chain. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is proved that “the contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing” has a significant stimulation on the promotion efforts of online shopping website; the elasticity coefficient of promotion efforts has a certain impact on promotion efforts, and increases in a certain range. The level of elasticity of sales efforts will increase the profits of all the enterprises in the supply chain. Once the sales promotion elasticity exceeds a critical value, the interests of all the members in the supply chain will be impaired.

Key words: credit payment, promotion efforts, Stackelberg game, supply chain coordination

摘要： 考虑到我国越来越多的电商平台为消费者提供基于互联网的信用支付策略作为重要的促销手段，构建了二级供应链中促销努力水平影响消费者需求的函数，研究其定价和促销努力水平协调问题。利用Stackelberg博弈分析供应链主体间的最优决策，并与集中模式下进行对比分析，为了促使电商平台提高促销努力水平，构建了“成本共担-收益共享”契约达到供应链协调的目的。通过数值分析证明：“成本共担-收益共享”契约对电商平台的促销努力水平具有显著的提升作用；促销努力水平弹性系数对于促销努力水平具有一定的影响，在一定区间内，增加促销努力水平弹性系数将使供应链各企业的利润增加，一旦促销努力弹性系数超过一个临界值就会使得供应链各主体的利益受损。

关键词: 信用支付, 促销努力, Stackelberg博弈, 供应链协调