Abstract: This paper introduces the commission rate of the aggregation platform and the service difference between ride-hailing service providers to describe the characteristics of the ride-hailing market under the aggregation mode, constructs the Stackelberg game model among the aggregation platform, providers and travelers, and discusses the pricing equilibrium of the ride-hailing market under the aggregation mode. Considering the subsidy pricing strategy of platform, this paper analyzes the impact of the subsidy strategy on the equilibrium pricing and the expected revenue of aggregation platform and providers. The results show that, under the aggregation mode, the service difference between ride-hailing service providers is an important factor affecting the commission rate and the service pricing in the ride-hailing market, which has a two-way impact on the expected revenue of the aggregation platform and providers. After the implementation of subsidies, the price subsidy provided by the aggregation platform to travelers increases the service price, and leads to an increase in the commission rate. Moreover, adopting reasonable subsidy pricing strategy can effectively improve the expected revenue of providers and the aggregation platform, and improve social welfare.

Key words: aggregation mode, subsidy pricing, commission rate, service difference, Stackelberg game

摘要： 针对聚合模式给网约车市场带来的收益分配和价格竞争问题，引入平台抽成和出行服务商服务差异刻画聚合模式下网约车市场的特征，构建了聚合平台和两服务商的斯坦伯格博弈模型，探讨了在聚合模式下网约车市场的定价均衡。随后引入平台补贴定价策略，分析了补贴策略对市场均衡定价以及聚合平台、出行服务商期望收益的影响。研究表明：聚合模式下出行服务商服务差异是影响平台抽成比例和网约车市场服务定价的重要因素，对聚合平台和出行服务商的期望收益有双向影响；平台对出行者的价格补贴提高了补贴前网约车市场的服务定价，导致平台抽成增加；采用合理的补贴定价策略可以有效提升出行服务商和聚合平台的收益，同时改进社会福利。

关键词: 聚合模式, 补贴定价, 平台抽成, 服务差异, 斯坦伯格博弈