Abstract:

Focusing on the process of online ride-hailing service in the single-homing market environment, the distribution of users and drivers is defined base in Salop model, and the Stackelberg game model between bilateral ride-hailing platforms is constructed. Furtherly, the impact of pricing strategy, competitive intensity, and operational cost on the profit, consumer surplus and supplier surplus are analyzed. The results show that the service prices of dominant platform and inferior platform increase and the bilateral users reduce with the increase of operational cost, but the effect on inferior platform is greater. The inferior platform has to implement copy-pricing strategy, low-pricing strategy and high-service quality strategy respectively in different competitive intensity. Otherwise, inferior platform can maximize profits, consumer surplus and supplier surplus by controlling operational cost.

Key words: sharing economy, online ride-hailing service, two-side market, pricing strategy, Stackelberg game

摘要：

针对用户与司机在单归属环境下网约车平台进行交易过程，运用Salop模型确定用户与司机在双边市场中的分布，构建两个网约车平台的Stackelberg博弈模型，研究网约车平台定价策略、市场竞争强度和平台成本对网约车平台利润、消费者剩余和生产者剩余的影响规律。研究表明，平台成本增加导致占优平台与劣势平台的服务价格均提高，从而引致自身平台双边用户减少，竞争平台的双边用户数量增加，且对劣势平台的影响更大。市场竞争强度小时，劣势平台应效仿占优平台进行中等定价，此时利润取得最大值；当竞争强度适中时，劣势平台应采取低价策略，占据低价敏感用户的细分市场；当市场竞争强度十分激烈时，劣势平台应该提升自身服务质量，针对市场中高水平的用户进行服务，实现最优利润。此外，劣势平台可以通过控制平台运营成本提高利润并实现消费者剩余与生产者剩余的最大化。

关键词: 分享经济, 网约车服务, 双边市场, 定价策略, Stackelberg博弈