Abstract: The paper mainly considers a two-cycle supply chain system, which contains a single manufacturer and a single retailer. In the case of the retailer storage strategic inventory after the end of the first cycle to control of the second cycle of manufacturer’s wholesale price, it establishes the centralized decision-making, the decentralized decision-making and the manufacturer promotion decision and compares the decision variables of each situation. The results show that the retailer has no need to store strategy inventory under the retailer-dominated scenario; and under the condition of the manufacturer-dominated scenario, the manufacturer’s wholesale price contract is unable to facilitate coordination channel. While under the conditions of the manufacturer promotion decision, the retailer’s strategic inventory is reduced and both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profit is higher than the optimal profit of decentralized decision-making. Finally, it uses an example to verify the validity of the model.

Key words: supply chain coordination, Stackelberg game, strategic inventory, promotion

摘要： 考虑由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两周期供应链系统，在第一周期结束后零售商储存战略库存控制第二周期制造商批发价格的活动条件下，分别建立了集中式决策、分散式决策以及制造商促销的契约决策的供应链模型，并对三种情况下的决策变量进行了比较分析。研究结果表明：在零售商主导的情境下，零售商没有必要储存战略库存；在制造商主导的情境下，制造商通过简单的批发价格契约无法促进渠道的协调，而在制造商进行促销决策条件下，零售商的战略库存量减少，且制造商和零售商的最优利润均大于分散式决策时的最优利润。最后通过算例验证该模型的有效性。

关键词: 供应链协调, Stackelberg博弈, 战略库存, 促销