Abstract: In order to study the problem with the semi-cooperative in carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion by a manufacturer and a retailer under different dominant structures, first, a complete cooperative game model between manufacturer and retailer is developed. Second, the semi-cooperative game models（manufacturer-led, retailer-led, Vertical Nash） are developed based on the manufacturer and retailer sharing each other’s low carbon activity cost, and the equilibrium results of the 4 models are comparatively analyzed. Finally, the method of Shapley value is introduced to coordinate semi-cooperative structures. It shows that, in the semi-cooperative structure of the manufacturer-led, the manufacturer is willing to share more the low carbon promotion cost for the retailer, and the low-carbon promotion effort is lowest; in the semi-cooperative structure of the retailer-led, the retailers is willing to share more the carbon emission reduction cost for the manufacturer, and the carbon emission reduction level is lowest; in the semi-cooperative structure of the Vertical Nash, they are closest to the complete cooperation level including the carbon emission reduction, the low carbon promotion effort and the retail price.

Key words: carbon emission reduction, low-carbon promotion, leading structure, supply chain

摘要： 为了研究不同主导结构下制造商和零售商半合作碳减排和低碳推广问题，构建了制造商和零售商完全合作博弈模型；分别构建制造商主导、零售商主导和无主导的制造商和零售商以相互分担对方低碳活动成本的半合作博弈模型，并对比4种模型的均衡结果；引入Shapley值法对半合作结构进行协调。研究表明：在制造商主导的半合作情形中，制造商愿意为零售商分担更多的低碳推广成本，碳减排水平最低；在零售商主导的半合作情形中，零售商愿意为制造商分担更多的碳减排成本，低碳推广努力程度最低；在无主导的半合作情形中，碳减排水平、低碳推广努力程度和零售价格离完全合作水平最近。

关键词: 碳减排, 低碳推广, 主导结构, 供应链