关键词: 供应链协调, Stackelberg博弈, 战略库存, 促销

Abstract: The paper mainly considers a two-cycle supply chain system, which contains a single manufacturer and a single retailer. In the case of the retailer storage strategic inventory after the end of the first cycle to control of the second cycle of manufacturer’s wholesale price, it establishes the centralized decision-making, the decentralized decision-making and the manufacturer promotion decision and compares the decision variables of each situation. The results show that the retailer has no need to store strategy inventory under the retailer-dominated scenario; and under the condition of the manufacturer-dominated scenario, the manufacturer’s wholesale price contract is unable to facilitate coordination channel. While under the conditions of the manufacturer promotion decision, the retailer’s strategic inventory is reduced and both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profit is higher than the optimal profit of decentralized decision-making. Finally, it uses an example to verify the validity of the model.

Key words: supply chain coordination, Stackelberg game, strategic inventory, promotion