关键词: 合作减排, 碳排放约束, 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The closed-loop supply chain system with carbon emission constraints and the manufacturer’s recovery is considered. Stackelberg game models without retailer’s cooperative carbon emissions reduction, with carbon emissions reduction increment income sharing and carbon emissions reduction investment cost sharing are developed, respectively. The corresponding optimal sharing proportion, carbon emissions reduction level recycling level and the optimal profit are obtained of the impact of closed-loop supply chain recycling prices, carbon emission constraint and other factors on carbon emissions reduction and recycling levels are analyzed. It is shown that the emission reduction level, optimal recycling level and retailer’s profit are maximum in the case of carbon emissions reduction investment cost sharing. The second is for the case of carbon emissions reduction increment income sharing. The last one is without retailer’s cooperative carbon emissions reduction. The manufacturer’s profit size relations of two ways of retailer’s cooperative carbon emissions reduction is determine based on the retailer unit sales revenue and the cost of manufacturer recycling activities. The two sharing proportion have the opposite effect in the changes of the closed-loop supply chain recycling prices and other factors.

Key words: cooperative carbon emission, carbon emission constraint, close-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game