Abstract: Incentive mechanisms aim to motivate users to participate in task scheduling and report private information truthfully. However, existing studies mainly focus on ensuring that users submit true task valuations when bidding, overlooking the issue of time strategy in online scenarios. Thus, selfish users can increase their utility by manipulating time, which affects the participation motivation of edge users, the total value of successfully scheduled tasks, and the fairness of scheduling results. To this end, an online mechanism-based time strategy-proof task scheduling method is proposed. False bidding means are analyzed to establish a practical range of limited-time misreporting. Considering time strategy, an allocation function applicable to online scenarios is designed, which ensures the monotonicity of task types and allocates tasks according to the allocation probability sequentially, thus obtaining the task scheduling results. A critical payment pricing algorithm is derived, that satisfies the incentive compatibility and prevents users from increasing their expected utility through time strategy. It is theoretically proved that the task scheduling mechanism satisfies truthfulness and individual rationality. The experimental results show that the mechanism effectively prevents both price strategy and time strategy by users.

Key words: edge computing, task scheduling, time strategy, online mechanism, truthfulness

摘要： 激励机制旨在激励用户参与任务调度并如实报告私有信息，但现有研究主要侧重于确保用户在投标时提交真实的任务估值，而未考虑在线场景中的时间操纵问题。因此自私用户可以通过时间操纵提高自身效用，从而影响边缘用户的参与积极性、成功调度任务总价值和调度结果的公平性。提出一种利用在线机制的时间抗操纵边缘计算任务调度方法。对虚假任务投标手段进行分析，得到符合实际的合理时间误报范围和价格误报；考虑到时间属性的操纵，设计一种适用于在线场景的分配函数，以保证任务类型的单调性，并根据分配概率依次分配任务得到任务调度结果；推导出满足激励相容的临界支付定价算法，该算法保证了用户无法通过时间操纵提高预期效用；从理论上证明了该任务调度机制满足真实性和个体理性。实验结果表明，该机制不仅能防范用户的价格操纵，同时还可以抵御时间操纵。

关键词: 边缘计算, 任务调度, 时间操纵, 在线机制, 真实性