Abstract: The Vendor Managed Inventory（VMI） supply chain system consisted of one retailer and one supplier is set as the research object. Under the stochastic demand of the VMI system, the unsalable cost and out punishment is considered. The paper builds up the markdown money mechanism coordination model with traditional game, Stackelberg game, two Nash negotiations of the same power and different powers. Through numeric examples, it is shown that the markdown money mechanism coordination of traditional game isn’t reasonable. The Stackelberg game can’t get the whole revenue of the integrated supply chain, but can improve the retailer and the supplier revenues. The same power Nash negotiation can perfectly coordinate the decentralized VMI. The increased retailer revenues are the same as the supplier’s. The different power Nash negotiation can also perfectly coordinate the decentralized VMI. The increased revenues of the retailer and the supplier are positive correlations of their own negotiating powers.

Key words: vendor managed inventory, markdown money mechanism, Stackelberg game, Nash negotiation, coordination

摘要： 以零售商和供应商组成的供应商管理库存（VMI）供应链系统为研究对象，考虑随机需求下VMI系统中可能存在滞销成本和缺货惩罚，建立传统、Stackelberg博弈、相同权力Nash协商、不同权力Nash协商的4种价格补贴机制的协调模型。通过数值分析得出：价格补贴机制下传统的VMI协调的不合理性；Stackelberg博弈的VMI协调达不到集成供应链整体收益，但可使零售商和供应商收益得到改善；相同权力和不同权力的Nash协商均能完美协调分散式VMI，零售商与供应商各自增加的收益在协商权力相同时是相等的，在协商权力不同时与自身协商权力正相关。

关键词: 供应商管理库存, 价格补贴机制, Stackelberg博弈, Nash协商, 协调