Abstract: Considering two competing upstream dominant enterprises in their respective supply chain, each firm decides whether to outsource the retail to the downstream third-party retailer and thus forming a downward decentralized supply chain structure. On the premise that the retailer has no advantage on sales cost, the revenue-sharing contract is introduced between manufacturer and retailer, and the influence of decentralized structure on the game equilibrium structure and supply chain profit is analyzed by Hotelling model. The results show that, compared with centralized structure, downward decentralized supply chain itself has the structural advantage that improve its supply chain profits and the competitive supply chain. This discovery is contrary to the common double marginalization effect and explains the outsourcing choice from the perspective of structural advantage. In addition, the values of sharing ratio in revenue-sharing contracts determine the equilibrium structures and evolution of supply chain competition.

Key words: competition, Hotelling model, contracts, decentralization, outsourcing

摘要： 考虑两条供应链间相互竞争的上游核心企业，分别决定是否将产品销售外包给各自的下游零售商，从而形成向下分散式的供应链结构。第三方无成本优势的前提下，制造商和零售商间引入收益共享契约，利用Hotelling模型探讨向下分散式结构对核心企业间博弈均衡结构及供应链利润的影响。结论表明：与集中式相比，分散式供应链本身具有结构优势，在提升自身供应链利润的同时也会促进另一条竞争供应链的利润水平，有悖于通常认为的“双重边际化效应”，从结构优势的视角解释了第三方外包，并且收益共享比例决定了供应链竞争的均衡结构及其演化。

关键词: 竞争, Hotelling模型, 契约, 分散式, 外包