Abstract: Finitely repeated rational secret sharing scheme is first proposed by Maleka and Shareef who conclude that there does not exist a Repeated Rational Secret Sharing Scheme（RRSSS） within constant rounds. However, RRSSS within infinite rounds is lack of efficiency and has no application value. To achieve an efficient RRSSS within constant rounds, players are set different types. An efficient RRSSS within constant rounds is put forward under incomplete information and then its validity is proved. Compared with other rational secret sharing schemes, given proper conditions, the new scheme has advantages in Nash equilibrium, expected running time and communication channel.

Key words: game theory, Nash equilibrium, finitely repeated games, rational secret sharing scheme

摘要： 基于重复博弈的理性秘密分享机制，首先由Maleka和Shareef提出，他们认为不存在常数轮的重复理性秘密分享机制（Repeated Rational Secret Sharing Scheme，RRSSS）。然而，无限轮RRSSS效率低下，不具备应用价值。为了实现高效的常数轮RRSSS，为参与者设置了不同的类型，提出了不完全信息下的常数轮RRSSS机制，并证明了机制的有效性。与其他理性秘密分享方案比较，在给定条件下，新方案在（纳什）均衡、期望执行时间和通信信道方面均具有优势。

关键词: 博弈论, 纳什均衡, 重复博弈, 理性秘密分享机制