Computer Engineering and Applications ›› 2020, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (13): 106-113.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.1902-0214

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Research on Bertrand Game and Incentive Mechanism for Selfish Nodes in Opportunistic Networks

WU Qing, ZENG Feng   

  1. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410000, China
  • Online:2020-07-01 Published:2020-07-02



  1. 中南大学 计算机学院,长沙 410000


In a real environment, many nodes may be selfish and unwilling to sacrifice their own resources to forward messages for other nodes. In this case, an incentive mechanism based on game theory to encourage the cooperation between nodes is proposed. This incentive provides two-stage incentives to nodes, which incentives node receives the message to assist other nodes to forward, while motivating the node to forward more messages. It models the cooperation between the source and the relay node as Bertrand game, and the utility functions of the source and the relay node are defined. It solves the best pricing scheme for the source node and the best forwarding plan for the relay node, and the Nash equilibrium is existed and unique between source node and relay node. The simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism can encourage the cooperation between selfish nodes, and improve the performance of routing algorithm in terms of delivery rate and delay. Compared with reputation-based incentive mechanism, the proposed mechanism has the success rate of message transmission increased by 31.4% and average delay decreased by 9.7%.

Key words: game theory , two-stage incentives, Bertrand game, Nash equilibrium



关键词: 博弈论, 二阶段激励, Bertrand博弈, 纳什均衡