Abstract: Based on a simplified evolutionary game model，this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of credit cheating behaviors in E-Commerce business.With regard to potentially technological or rule defaults in credit system as well as traders’ selfish rationality，presence of credit cheating is to some extent unavoidable.It then suggests a new kind of credit system，which is independently coexistent with traders and trading，should be set up to control credit cheating.Simulation experiments support the ideas aforementioned.

摘要： 通过一个简化的演化博弈模型，发现由于信用体系存在技术上或规则上的潜在漏洞，以及交易者是自利理性的，电子商务信用骗取行为的出现不可避免。为此构建种群共存模型，分析信用评级与交易者之间不同关系的稳定演化结果，提出建立一种与交易者“独立共存”的新型信用体系以有效防范信用骗取。仿真实验很好地支持了上述结论。