Abstract: Against the background of the COVID-19, cross-border e-commerce has further become an important channel for trade market development. The supply chain composed of an export retailer, a cross-border e-commerce platform and foreign consumers is studied. When the government gives or does not give subsidies to the platform, three cooperation modes between the platform and the export retailer are considered, that is, non cooperation mode, cost sharing mode and fixed cost mode. A Stackelberg game model among the export retailer, the platform and the government is established, and the decision-making results under each mode are analyzed and compared. The results show that whether the government provides subsidies for platforms has an important impact on the choice of cooperation modes between platforms and retailers. When the cost coefficient of platform promotion is large, the government should provide subsidies to the platform. When the government provides subsidies to platforms, cross-border e-commerce platforms and export retailers are more inclined to choose the non cooperative mode.

Key words: cross-border e-commerce supply chain, government subsidies, cooperation mode, optimal decision

摘要： 新冠疫情背景下，跨境电商进一步成为贸易市场开拓的重要渠道。研究了由出口零售商、跨境电商平台和外国消费者组成的供应链。在政府给予或不给予平台补贴两种情况下，分别考虑了平台与出口零售商之间的三种合作模式，即不合作模式、成本分担合作模式和固定费用合作模式，建立了出口零售商、平台和政府之间的博弈模型，并对每种模式下的决策结果进行分析和比较。研究发现，政府是否为平台提供补贴对平台与零售商合作模式的选择有重要影响。当平台推广的成本系数较大时，政府应该向平台提供补贴。而当政府向平台提供补贴时，跨境电商平台和出口零售商更倾向于选择不合作模式。

关键词: 跨境电商供应链, 政府补贴, 合作模式, 最优决策