Abstract: Considering the manufacturer’s risk aversion behavior in the closed-loop supply chain game model under different power structures, the influence of risk aversion and power structure on consumers and the closed-loop supply chain is discussed using the risk measurement criterion of mean variance. The results show that with the improvement of manufacturer’s risk aversion, wholesale price, green degree, retail price and cost performance of products under each power structure gradually decrease. Leader in the market has the advantages of first action, and the dominant supply chain leader always make more favorable decisions in the marked game. For manufacturer, avoiding risk properly is helpful to improve the utility of manufacturer in the market dominated by retailer and with no power structure, and the risk aversion is unfavorable to him in the market dominated by himself. When consumers’ pursuit of green quality is low, the market with no power structure is most favorable to them, otherwise the market dominated by retailer is more favorable. No matter what kind of market power structure consumers are in, manufacturer’s risk aversion behavior is unfavorable to them.

Key words: power structure, closed-loop supply chain, risk aversion, mean -variance

摘要： 将制造商风险规避行为特征考虑到不同权力结构闭环供应链博弈模型中，利用均值-方差理论探讨风险规避行为和权力结构对闭环供应链决策的影响。研究表明：随着制造商风险规避程度的提高，各权力结构下的批发价、绿色度、零售价和产品性价比逐渐降低；市场中领导者的先动优势总会使其制定出更加有利于自身的决策。对于制造商而言，在零售商主导和无权力结构的市场中，适度的规避风险有助于其效用的提高，而在自身主导的市场中，风险规避行为反而对其不利；当消费者对产品绿色品质的追求较低时，处于无权力结构的市场最有利，否则处于零售商主导的市场会更有利，然而无论消费者处于何种权力结构的市场，制造商风险规避行为都会对其产生负面影响。

关键词: 权力结构, 闭环供应链, 风险规避, 均值-方差