Abstract: In the background of uncertain market environment of low carbon product sales, a low carbon risk remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain model with double third party recyclers is constructed by using Stackelberg game theory method and the loss-averse method. The action mechanism is comprehensively analyzed and studied about influence factors of manufacturer’s low carbon emission capacity, carbon tax policy factor, retailer’s risk aversion and competition characteristics of waste low carbon product recycling market. And the change rule and implied economic significance and management concept are revealed about order quantity, transaction price, low carbon product recycling price and node earnings, expected utility and whole supply chain revenue under the circumstances of non cooperative game and coordinated operation. The contracts of the forward channel revenue sharing and reverse channel risk sharing are designed to overcome the adverse effects of risk aversion influence and double marginal influence, and the coordination of the low remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain is achieved. Finally, through numerical simulation and sensitivity analysis, the validity and practicability of the low-carbon remanufacturing closed loop supply chain model are verified. It provides the theoretical basis and policy recommendations for the cooperation between the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain to carry out low-carbon emission.

Key words: carbon emission reduction capacity, carbon tax, loss-averse, Cournot competition, contract, remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain

摘要： 以低碳产品销售为不确定市场环境为背景，以Stackelberg博弈理论为方法，以loss-averse为工具，构建了双第三方回收低碳风险再制造闭环供应链模型，研究了制造商低碳减排能力、碳排放征税政策、销售商风险厌恶程度和废旧低碳产品回收市场竞争特性等因素的影响作用机理；揭示非合作博弈和协调运作下，订单数量、交易价格、低碳废旧产品回收价格等重要变量和节点企业收益、期望效用及整个链条收益的变化规律及隐含的经济意义与管理理念。设计正向渠道收益共享、逆向渠道风险共担契约，克服风险规避效应和双重边际效应的不利影响，实现低碳再制造闭环供应链的协调；通过数值仿真研究和灵敏度分析，验证了低碳风险再制造闭环供应链模型的有效性及实用性，为供应链上下游企业开展低碳减排合作提供了理论依据和政策建议。

关键词: 碳减排能力, 碳税, 风险规避, 古诺竞争, 契约, 再制造闭环供应链