Abstract: Supply chain finance can solve the problem of funding constraints for SME without core assets effectively. This paper deals with the three-level supply chain of manufacturers, distributors and retailers. Considering the influence of different funds of retailers on financing interest rate change. This paper studies revenue changes in the joint contract supply chain by using before and after financing under complete information, realizes the parameter of supply chain coordination and the change of each member’s income. It analyzes the impact of private information on the supply chain by comparing the situation of the retailer selling cost asymmetric information. Moreover, numerical analysis has been carried out by numerical examples. The results show that the financing service can increase the expected return of each member of the supply chain when retailers have financial constraints under complete information, and the repurchase contract can coordinate the supply chain effectively after financing. Supply chains are less efficient under asymmetric information. However, well-funded retailers can get more benefits from private cost information. But private information loses value when capital is restrained.

Key words: funding constraints, joint contract, coordination, asymmetric information

摘要： 供应链金融能够有效解决无核心资产的中小企业资金约束的问题。针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链，考虑了零售商自有资金的不同对融资利率变化的影响，研究了在完全信息下采用融资前后联合契约供应链的收益变化，实现供应链协调的参数和各成员收益的变化，将零售商销售成本信息不对称下的情况作为对比，分析零售商私有信息对供应链的影响，通过算例进行了数值分析。结果表明，在完全信息下零售商存在资金约束时，融资服务能够增加供应链各成员的期望收益，回购契约与收益共享契约组成的联合契约能够协调采用融资后的供应链，在非对称信息下，供应链的效率有所减少，而资金充足的零售商会因私有成本信息获得更多的收益，但是在资金约束时，私有信息却失去了价值。

关键词: 资金约束, 联合契约, 协调, 非对称信息