Abstract: An evolutionary game model of Reverse Supply Chain（RSC） is established based on duplication dynamics function and evolutionary stable strategy. Using the model framework, this paper provides insights into a deeper understanding on how each supplier make strategic decision independently in reverse supply chain to determine their performance. The main conclusion is as follow: under the market mechanism, not unless the extra income derived from the implementation of RSC exceeds zero point, would the suppliers implement RSC strategy. When those suppliers are passive to RSC, the effective solution is that the government takes macro-control measures, for example, to force those suppliers implement RSC through punishment mechanism.

Key words: Reverse Supply Chain（RSC）, duplication dynamics, Evolutionary Stable Strategy（ESS）

摘要： 生产型企业通过实施逆向供应链策略取代传统供应链的单向运作模式，可以减少对环境的负面影响和对资源的过度依赖，对本企业生产的废旧产品回收再利用成为当前发展新趋势。将逆向供应链作为一类复杂适应系统，基于复制动态方程和演化稳定策略，构建了逆向供应链演化博弈模型，分析和讨论了逆向供应链中每一个供应商决策如何影响供应链绩效。在市场机制下，供应商的额外收益超出实施逆向供应链的成本，供应商才会采取实施逆向供应链策略，而在政府管制下，相应规制可以有效促进逆向供应链策略的实施。

关键词: 逆向供应链, 复制动态, 演化稳定策略