Abstract: This paper considers a raw material pricing contract design problem, in which a manufacturer purchases raw materials from a raw material supplier, but the manufacturer’s processing cost is private information. Furthermore, two strategies, named wholesale price and fixed transfer are simultaneously employed in the contract. A raw material pricing contract model is developed with the purpose of maximizing the raw material supplier’s expected payoff, and its equivalent form is obtained. The optimal contracts are obtained under the cases of complete information and incomplete information, respectively. The optimal contracts demonstrate that the optimal purchasing quantity under incomplete information is less than that of under complete information.

Key words: contract, raw material pricing, principal-agent, incomplete information

摘要： 基于委托代理理论，研究了供应链中原材料定价合同设计问题，生产商从原材料供应商处购买原材料，加工成本为生产商的私人信息。进一步，在设计定价合同时，同时考虑了批发价格策略和固定支付策略。以原材料供应商期望收益最大化为目标，建立了一个原材料定价合同模型，得到了其等价形式，并分别在完全信息和不完全信息情况下给出了相应的最优合同的解析形式。最优合同表明不完全信息下生产商的次优购买数量小于完全信息下最优购买数量。

关键词: 合同, 原材料定价, 委托代理, 不完全信息