Abstract: The coordination of the live streaming supply chain is an important guarantee for promoting the development of the digital economy and maintaining the resilience and stability of the supply chain. Aiming at the problem of coordinating-contract selection in the live streaming supply chain, a two- echelon supply chain game model consisting of a manufacturer and a live streaming platform is constructed, and the optimal decision-making and profit differences of the live streaming supply chain under cost sharing and revenue sharing contracts are compared and analyzed, and the impact of the contract on the optimal decision-making and profit of the live streaming supply chain through negotiation and non-negotiation is explored. The study finds that：（1）The live-streaming effort level under the revenue sharing contract is higher than that under the cost sharing contract, but the wholesale price is lower than that under the cost sharing contract, and which retail price is higher under the two contracts depends on a threshold value. （2）Whether it is the profit of supply chain members or the overall profit, the revenue sharing contract is better than the cost sharing contract. （3）The reputation of streamer positively affects the live-streaming efforts and retail prices, and the impact on members profit and overall profit of the live streaming supply chain decreases and then increases. （4）Compared with the non-bargaining situation, in the case of equal bargaining power, the overall profit of the live-streaming supply chain and the profit of manufacturer under both contracts increase, while the profit of the live streaming platform decreases. When the bargaining power is not equal, the overall profit of the live streaming supply chain under both contracts increases with the increase of the bargaining power of the manufacturer.

Key words: live streaming supply chain, coordination contract, live streaming marketing efforts, streamer reputation, bargaining power

摘要： 直播供应链协调是促进数字经济发展和维护供应链韧性和稳定的重要保障。针对直播供应链协调契约选择问题，构建一个制造商和一个直播平台组成的两级供应链博弈模型，对比分析成本分担、收益共享契约对供应链最优决策及利润影响的差异，探讨契约由双方谈判与非谈判决定时对直播供应链最优决策和利润的影响。研究发现：（1）收益共享契约下的直播努力水平高于成本分担契约，但批发价低于成本分担契约，哪种契约下的零售价更高取决于临界值。（2）无论是直播供应链成员利润还是整体利润，收益共享契约优于成本分担契约。（3）主播声望正向影响直播努力水平和零售价格，对直播供应链成员及整体利润的影响先降后增。（4）与非谈判情形相比，谈判势力均等时两种契约下的直播供应链利润与制造商利润都提高，而直播平台利润下降。当谈判势力不均等时，两种契约下直播供应链利润都随制造商的谈判势力增强而增加。

关键词: 直播供应链, 协调契约, 直播营销努力, 主播声望, 谈判势力