Computer Engineering and Applications ›› 2022, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (14): 313-320.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.2011-0280

• Engineering and Applications • Previous Articles    

Research on Logistics Service Decision of Platform and Retailer Under Market Competition

QIU Zhuolei, YANG Bin   

  1. Institute of Logistics Science and Engineering Research, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
  • Online:2022-07-15 Published:2022-07-15

市场竞争下平台与零售商的物流服务决策研究

邱卓磊,杨斌   

  1. 上海海事大学 物流科学与工程研究院,上海 201306

Abstract: In recent years, it has become very common for e-commerce platforms to operate self-operated products and retailers to open up online sales channels. An e-commerce platform with a self-built logistics system not only provides online market and logistics services for e-retailers, but also establishes online self-operated stores and e-retailers to compete in the market. This kind of logistics service decision-making between the two parties under mutual cooperation and competition behavior is worth studying. Therefore, using principal-agent theory, a two-stage dynamic game model between e-commerce platforms and e-retailers is established to analyze the optimal logistics service decisions of both parties under different conditions. The study found that:there is a threshold of market demand and commission rate. For products whose market demand is less than this threshold, the e-commerce platform charges a commission rate higher than this threshold. The e-commerce platform can provide e-retailers with higher level logistics services and charge lower logistics fees. At this time, e-retailers will use the logistics services provided by the e-commerce platform, and both parties can achieve win-win cooperation. For products whose market demand is greater than this threshold, or the commission rate charged by e-commerce platforms is lower than this threshold, because third-party logistics companies can provide e-retailers with higher-level logistics services and charge lower logistics fees, e-commerce retailers will use the logistics services of third-party logistics companies, and e-commerce platforms will increase their profits by adjusting the commission rate.

Key words: e-commerce platform, e-retailer, dynamic game, logistics service decision

摘要: 近年来电商平台自营商品和零售商开辟线上销售渠道已非常普遍。拥有自建物流体系的电商平台不仅为电子零售商提供线上市场和物流服务,同时还建立线上自营店与电子零售商竞争市场,这种处于相互合作竞争关系下双方的物流服务决策行为值得研究。因此,运用委托代理理论,建立电商平台与电子零售商的两阶段动态博弈模型,分析不同情况下双方的最优物流服务决策。研究发现:存在一个市场需求和佣金率阈值,对于市场需求小于此阈值,电商平台收取佣金率高于此阈值的商品,电商平台能为电子零售商提供更高水平的物流服务和收取更低的物流费用,此时电子零售商会使用电商平台提供的物流服务,双方能实现合作共赢。对于市场需求大于此阈值,或者电商平台收取佣金率低于此阈值的商品,由于第三方物流企业能为电子零售商提供更高水平的物流服务和收取更低的物流费用,此时电子零售商会使用第三方物流企业的物流服务,而电商平台会通过调整佣金率提高自身利润。

关键词: 电商平台, 电子零售商, 动态博弈, 物流服务决策