Computer Engineering and Applications ›› 2010, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (1): 208-210.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.2010.01.062
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ZHUO Xiang-zhi1,2,WANG Xu2,WANG Zhen-feng2
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卓翔芝1,2,王 旭2,王振锋2
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Abstract: In view of the instability and the high failure rate of practical supply chain alliance companionate symbiosis,the paper establishes a proceeds matrix model of its static game,and uses evolution games to analyze its formation and evolution under symmetric and asymmetric.The result shows in the actual game,the state the partner enterprise evolves through the study has to do with the initial probability of choosing the cooperation.The greater proportion of the proceeds,cost and the greater willingness to cooperate,the steadier the allied trend.Furthermore,it is the easiest that the alliance evolves stable symbiosis when the two sides of the game share the cooperative cost and proceeds.
Key words: supply chain alliance, companionate symbiosis, evolution game
摘要: 针对现实中供应链联盟伙伴合作关系的不稳定性和失败率高的问题,建立了伙伴企业合作静态博弈的得益矩阵模型,并利用进化博弈理论研究了对称和非对称两种情况下供应链联盟伙伴合作关系的形成及进化演变。研究结果表明,在实际博弈中,伙伴企业通过学习进化到什么状态,与初始时选择合作的概率有关;联盟的收益与合作成本的比例越大,联盟中伙伴合作的意愿越大,联盟越趋于稳定;当博弈双方平分合作成本及合作收益时,联盟进化为稳定的合作关系的可能性最大。
关键词: 供应链联盟, 合作关系, 进化博弈
CLC Number:
F224.32
ZHUO Xiang-zhi1,2,WANG Xu2,WANG Zhen-feng2. Study on evolution game of supply chain alliance companionate symbiosis[J]. Computer Engineering and Applications, 2010, 46(1): 208-210.
卓翔芝1,2,王 旭2,王振锋2. 供应链联盟伙伴合作关系的进化博弈研究[J]. 计算机工程与应用, 2010, 46(1): 208-210.
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URL: http://cea.ceaj.org/EN/10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.2010.01.062
http://cea.ceaj.org/EN/Y2010/V46/I1/208