Abstract: With the frequent occurrence of false warehouse receipts and defaults of SMEs in the process of warehouse receipts pledge financing, the pressures of supervision faced by banks have gradually increased, and the contradictions between banks and enterprises are difficult to resolve. The emergence of blockchain technology facilitates the supervision of banks, block chain can share transaction information and make financing more transparent. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model between banks and SMEs, first calculates and analyzes the influence of information sharing factors and blockchain technology factors on the model according to the position of equilibrium points in the evolution phase diagram, discusses the decision-making changes and evolution paths of both parties, and then conducts numerical simulation analysis through MATLAB to further verify the reliability of mathematical calculation results. Final results show that information sharing incentives and block incentives will prompt banks to choose blockchain to supervise, while factors such as information sharing risks and blockchain costs are different. Finally, some corresponding suggestions are put forward for the results of the evolutionary game model.

Key words: warehouse receipt pledge, block chain, evolutionary game, information sharing

摘要： 随着中小企业仓单质押融资过程中的仓单造假、违约现象的频发，银行面临的监管压力也逐渐增大，银企之间的矛盾难以得到解决。区块链技术的产生为银行的监管提供了便利，它能够实现交易信息的共享，使得融资更加透明化。建立了银行和中小企业双方的演化博弈模型，根据演化相位图中均衡点的位置，计算和分析了信息共享因素和区块链技术因素对模型的影响，探讨双方的决策变化及演化路径，通过MATLAB进行数值仿真分析，进一步验证了计算结果的可靠性，最终结果表明信息共享激励和区块激励等因素会促使银行选择区块链监管，而信息共享风险和区块链成本等因素则相反，最后针对演化博弈模型的结果提出了一些相应的建议。

关键词: 仓单质押, 区块链, 演化博弈, 信息共享