计算机工程与应用 ›› 2018, Vol. 54 ›› Issue (12): 226-234.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.1701-0239

• 工程与应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

带碳排放约束的闭环供应链企业合作减排决策

李  辉,汪传旭   

  1. 上海海事大学 经济管理学院,上海 201306
  • 出版日期:2018-06-15 发布日期:2018-07-03

Closed loop supply chain enterprise cooperative carbon emission decisions with carbon emission constraints

LI Hui, WANG Chuanxu   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
  • Online:2018-06-15 Published:2018-07-03

摘要: 考虑碳排放约束且由制造商负责回收的低碳闭环供应链系统。构建了零售商不参与减排、零售商向制造商提供减排所增利润分享和减排成本分担3种不同模式的Stackelberg博弈模型,得到相应的最优利润分享和成本分担比例、最优减排水平和最优回收水平,以及成员最优利润值,并分析闭环供应链回收价格和碳排放约束等因素对减排水平和回收水平的影响。结果表明:减排成本分担合作减排的减排水平、回收水平和零售商利润最大,其次是减排所增利润分享合作减排,最后是零售商不参与减排;减排成本分担合作减排和减排所增利润分享合作减排下的制造商利润大小关系要依据零售商单位销售收益和制造商回收活动的投入成本来确定。闭环供应链回收价格等因素的变化对两种分成比例产生相反的影响。

关键词: 合作减排, 碳排放约束, 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The closed-loop supply chain system with carbon emission constraints and the manufacturer’s recovery is considered. Stackelberg game models without retailer’s cooperative carbon emissions reduction, with carbon emissions reduction increment income sharing and carbon emissions reduction investment cost sharing are developed, respectively. The corresponding optimal sharing proportion, carbon emissions reduction level recycling level and the optimal profit are obtained of the impact of closed-loop supply chain recycling prices, carbon emission constraint and other factors on carbon emissions reduction and recycling levels are analyzed. It is shown that the emission reduction level, optimal recycling level and retailer’s profit are maximum in the case of carbon emissions reduction investment cost sharing. The second is for the case of carbon emissions reduction increment income sharing. The last one is without retailer’s cooperative carbon emissions reduction. The manufacturer’s profit size relations of two ways of retailer’s cooperative carbon emissions reduction is determine based on the retailer unit sales revenue and the cost of manufacturer recycling activities. The two sharing proportion have the opposite effect in the changes of the closed-loop supply chain recycling prices and other factors.

Key words: cooperative carbon emission, carbon emission constraint, close-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game