关键词: 权力结构, 闭环供应链, 风险规避, 均值-方差

Abstract: Considering the manufacturer’s risk aversion behavior in the closed-loop supply chain game model under different power structures, the influence of risk aversion and power structure on consumers and the closed-loop supply chain is discussed using the risk measurement criterion of mean variance. The results show that with the improvement of manufacturer’s risk aversion, wholesale price, green degree, retail price and cost performance of products under each power structure gradually decrease. Leader in the market has the advantages of first action, and the dominant supply chain leader always make more favorable decisions in the marked game. For manufacturer, avoiding risk properly is helpful to improve the utility of manufacturer in the market dominated by retailer and with no power structure, and the risk aversion is unfavorable to him in the market dominated by himself. When consumers’ pursuit of green quality is low, the market with no power structure is most favorable to them, otherwise the market dominated by retailer is more favorable. No matter what kind of market power structure consumers are in, manufacturer’s risk aversion behavior is unfavorable to them.

Key words: power structure, closed-loop supply chain, risk aversion, mean -variance