关键词: 供应商管理库存, 价格补贴机制, Stackelberg博弈, Nash协商, 协调

Abstract: The Vendor Managed Inventory（VMI） supply chain system consisted of one retailer and one supplier is set as the research object. Under the stochastic demand of the VMI system, the unsalable cost and out punishment is considered. The paper builds up the markdown money mechanism coordination model with traditional game, Stackelberg game, two Nash negotiations of the same power and different powers. Through numeric examples, it is shown that the markdown money mechanism coordination of traditional game isn’t reasonable. The Stackelberg game can’t get the whole revenue of the integrated supply chain, but can improve the retailer and the supplier revenues. The same power Nash negotiation can perfectly coordinate the decentralized VMI. The increased retailer revenues are the same as the supplier’s. The different power Nash negotiation can also perfectly coordinate the decentralized VMI. The increased revenues of the retailer and the supplier are positive correlations of their own negotiating powers.

Key words: vendor managed inventory, markdown money mechanism, Stackelberg game, Nash negotiation, coordination