计算机工程与应用 ›› 2019, Vol. 55 ›› Issue (10): 225-232.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.1803-0013

• 工程与应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

港内集装箱码头腹地和转运业务竞合研究

蒋先稳1,孟燕萍1,2   

  1. 1.上海海事大学 物流研究中心,上海 201306
    2.上海财经大学 国际工商管理学院,上海 200433
  • 出版日期:2019-05-15 发布日期:2019-05-13

Co-Opetition Research on Hinterland and Transshipment Business of Container Terminals in One Port Area

JIANG Xianwen1, MENG Yanping1,2   

  1. 1.Logistics Research Center, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
    2.International Business School, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Online:2019-05-15 Published:2019-05-13

摘要: 近年来,随着港口服务收费管制不断放松,集装箱码头所有权和经营权的分离,以及合资码头的大量出现,为了争夺市场份额,同一港口区域内集装箱码头间竞争将越加明显和激烈。应用博弈理论研究同一港区内两个码头集装箱业务的竞争与合作问题。在考虑缓解码头内部拥堵进行容量投资的情况下,探讨同一港区内两个码头的腹地进出口和转运集装箱业务的容量投资策略和服务定价策略,并对其吞吐量、利润进行了对比。研究表明:(1)码头容量投资不论对腹地市场还是转运市场都具有积极的作用,各自的吞吐量都会随着投资程度的增加而增加,对于容量小或基础设施相对落后的码头会更倾向于进行容量投资;(2)两个码头无论是选择合作或加大自身容量投资程度对转运市场利润的提升幅度都要大于同等情况下的腹地市场;(3)同一港区两个码头合作后选择恰当的容量投资程度可大幅提升整体利润,合作后两码头的利润更趋于均衡,避免了港区内恶性竞争。

关键词: 港内竞争与合作, 腹地和转运集装箱业务, 非合作博弈, 码头拥堵投资

Abstract: In recent years, a large number of joint venture terminals established in China, with the separation of ownership and management of container terminals, as well as deregulated port service charges constantly, in order to compete for market share, competition among container terminals in one port area is more and more obvious and intense. Applying the game theory to study the competition and cooperation between two container terminals in the same port area. In consideration of easing the internal congestion of terminals for capacity investment, this paper discusses the capacity investment strategy and service pricing strategy of the import, export and transshipment containers in the hinterland of the two terminals in the same port area, and compares the throughput and profit. This paper finds that:(1)Terminal capacity investment has a positive impact on both the hinterland and transshipment container business, and their respective throughputs increase as the degree of investment increases, and poor infrastructure terminal will be more inclined to capacity investment. (2)Whether to choose the cooperation or increase the investment degree of the terminal, the increase of profit in transshipment container business is greater than in the hinterland container market. (3)After the cooperation, terminals choose the appropriate investment degree, which can greatly improve its overall profit, and the profit of the two terminals is more balanced, avoiding the vicious competition in one port area.

Key words: port competition and cooperation, hinterland and transshipment container business, non-cooperative game, terminal congestion investment