密码芯片侧信道攻击仿真环境的设计与实现

计算机工程与应用 ›› 2012, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (31): 69-72.

密码芯片侧信道攻击仿真环境的设计与实现

姚剑波1，张涛2

1.遵义师范学院计算机科学系，贵州遵义 563002
2.中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所卫士通公司，成都 610041

出版日期:2012-11-01 发布日期:2012-10-30

Side channel attacks simulation environment design and implementation for crypto-chip

YAO Jianbo1, ZHANG Tao2

1.Department of Computer Science, Zunyi Normal College, Zunyi, Guizhou 563002, China
2.Westone Corporation of No.30 Research Institute, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Chengdu 610041, China

Online:2012-11-01 Published:2012-10-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 侧信道攻击是一种强有力的物理安全分析方法，密码芯片侧信道攻击的安全评估一般都是在生产后期进行的，但生产后期进行侧信道攻击安全评估具有费时、容易出错及费用高昂等缺陷。为了提高效率，有必要在设计阶段进行侧信道攻击安全评估，这需相应的侧信道仿真工具支持。针对侧信道攻击需要相应的侧信道仿真工具支持的特点，提出一种侧信道攻击仿真环境的设计方案。该方案采用软硬件协同设计的思想，通过泄露仿真机制和安全分析策略相分离的方法，用构件技术来建立侧信道攻击的仿真环境，能在密码芯片的设计阶段对侧信道攻击进行仿真分析。与现有的PINPAS仿真环境相比，该环境具有灵活、高效的特点。

关键词: 侧信道攻击, 密码芯片, 仿真环境

Abstract: Side-Channel Attack（SCA）is a powerful physical safety analysis method, the SCA security assessment for crypto-chip is generally in production, but with time-consuming, safety evaluation error-prone and costly wait for blemish. In order to improve the efficiency, it is necessary at design time to do SCA, but the safety evaluation needs the corresponding side channel simulation tool support. This paper presents the design scheme of SCA simulation environment. The scheme adopts the software and hardware of collaborative design thoughts, and though separating the leak simulation mechanism and safety analysis strategies, SCA simulation environment is established with component technology, can do SCA simulation analysis at design time of the crypto-chip. Compared with the existing PINPAS simulation environment, the environment has flexible and efficient characteristics.

Key words: Side-Channel Attack（SCA）, cryptographic chip, simulation environment

姚剑波1，张涛2. 密码芯片侧信道攻击仿真环境的设计与实现[J]. 计算机工程与应用, 2012, 48(31): 69-72.

YAO Jianbo1, ZHANG Tao2. Side channel attacks simulation environment design and implementation for crypto-chip[J]. Computer Engineering and Applications, 2012, 48(31): 69-72.

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