关键词: 聚合模式, 补贴定价, 平台抽成, 服务差异, 斯坦伯格博弈

Abstract: This paper introduces the commission rate of the aggregation platform and the service difference between ride-hailing service providers to describe the characteristics of the ride-hailing market under the aggregation mode, constructs the Stackelberg game model among the aggregation platform, providers and travelers, and discusses the pricing equilibrium of the ride-hailing market under the aggregation mode. Considering the subsidy pricing strategy of platform, this paper analyzes the impact of the subsidy strategy on the equilibrium pricing and the expected revenue of aggregation platform and providers. The results show that, under the aggregation mode, the service difference between ride-hailing service providers is an important factor affecting the commission rate and the service pricing in the ride-hailing market, which has a two-way impact on the expected revenue of the aggregation platform and providers. After the implementation of subsidies, the price subsidy provided by the aggregation platform to travelers increases the service price, and leads to an increase in the commission rate. Moreover, adopting reasonable subsidy pricing strategy can effectively improve the expected revenue of providers and the aggregation platform, and improve social welfare.

Key words: aggregation mode, subsidy pricing, commission rate, service difference, Stackelberg game