关键词: 绿色供应链, 政府补贴, 斯塔克尔伯格博弈, 社会责任

Abstract:

Aiming at the green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper focuses on the retailers’social responsibility performance, and uses Stackelberg game to explore the impact of different forms of government subsidies on research and development  investment of green manufacturers and social responsibility of retailers under different subsidies, as well as the optimal subsidy strategy and the optimal subsidy rate of the government. The researches suggest that government subsidies have a influence on research and development investment in green manufacturing and retailers’ social responsibility, and government subsidies are conducive to encourage manufacturers to increase research and development of green products and encourage retailers to undertake more social responsibility. In the case of government subsidies, the social welfare increases first and then decreases with the subsidy rate, and there is a maximum value. Within a certain threshold, the social welfare is the largest when the government subsidizes the manufacturer’s green research and development. The government’s optimal subsidy strategy is to subsidize the manufacturer’s green product research and development investment, and the optimal subsidy rate exists. Government subsidies can narrow the profit gap between manufacturers and retailers, and enhance the stability of  supply chain.

Key words: green supply chain, government subsidies, Stackelberg game, social responsibility