关键词: 单一补贴, 双重补贴, 低碳宣传, 斯坦伯格博弈

Abstract: A supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered to research on cooperative emission reduction and low-carbon propaganda, the Stackelberg game theory is used to construct a decentralized decision-making game model for a single low-carbon propaganda subsidy（SS） from the manufacturer to retailer and a double low-carbon propaganda subsidy（DS） from the government to manufacturer and from the manufacturer to retailer. The optimal carbon reduction rate, low-carbon propaganda efforts and the proportion of low-carbon propaganda costs are obtained. Through the comparative analysis, it is shown that under the DS mode the profits of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, reduction rate, low-carbon propaganda effort and low-carbon propaganda cost share are superior to SS mode when the government subsidy coefficient exceeds a certain value. The increase of government subsidies, the difficulty of reducing emissions and the reduction of the cost coefficient of retailer’s propaganda efforts will increase the profits of manufacturer, retailer and supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.

Key words: single subsidy, double subsidies, low-carbon propaganda, Stackelberg game