关键词: 双边匹配, 市场设计, 稳定匹配, 单边占优

Abstract: In view of the unilateral dominance problem, the lack of minimum guarantee and inability to adjust individual priority of traditional two-sided matching algorithms, this research proposes WYS algorithm which can be used in one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many two-sided matching problems. WYS algorithm allows each participant to traverse all the objects in its preference list by exogenously giving priority, thusly the total utility and the utility of the worst group can both be improved. It also makes the individual regulation possible. Then in accordance with the Nobel Prize winner Roth’s “economic engineering”, experiments are designed to explore the properties of WYS algorithm. The stability feature, non-unilateral dominance feature and participants’ minimum guarantee of WYS algorithm are proven by numerous random experiments. WYS algorithm is of great significance in maintaining the thickness of market and balancing between efficiency and fairness, and also enriches the application scenario of matching theory.

Key words: two-sided matching, market design, stable matching, unilateral dominance