关键词: 硬件木马, 差分故障分析, 高级加密标准

Abstract: Aiming at the characteristics of uncertainty and poor controllability in general differential fault analysis fault injection, a new small-scale and low trigger Trojan design is proposed. Using the maximum period sequence generated by a linear feedback shift register as an activation conditions and implementing controllable fault injection by individual XOR door, the corresponding differential fault analysis is proposed. The Trojan is implanted in the AES encryption circuit which is implanted in the FPGA chip, the fault is injected in the first line of intermediate state behind the eighth round shiftrows, and the differential fault attack is run. Experimental results show that, all the key of AES can be restored only by two right ciphertexts and wrong ciphertexts, and it takes only 5 s.

Key words: hardware Trojan, differential fault analysis, advanced encryption standard